

CULTURAL THEORY AND MANAGERIAL VALUES: EXAMINING TRUST AS A MOTIVATION FOR COLLABORATION

THADDIEUS W. CONNER, MATTHEW C. NOWLIN, THOMAS RABOVSKY
AND JOSEPH T. RIPBERGER

Public administration theorists have long argued that values of administrative actors fundamentally shape the quality and nature of the public services they provide. While there has been some work in recent years to measure values in the public sector like Public Service Motivation, we know relatively little about the role that other (more basic) values play in shaping managerial behaviour. To fill this gap, we argue that Cultural Theory (CT), a prominent theory within research on risk and public opinion, provides a general framework for operationalizing and measuring the values of public managers, which (if pursued) allows scholars to directly test important yet untested hypotheses about the relationship between values and managerial decision-making. To explore this proposition, we use data from a recent survey of American Indian education directors in public school districts to examine the relationship between cultural worldviews and managerial motivation to engage actors in collaborative arrangements.

INTRODUCTION

Public managers play a vital role in the connection between policy and outcomes, with policy-making authority typically diffused across multiple institutions and actors. The importance of public managers arises, at least in part, from the authority and autonomy (discretion) granted to them by other policy actors (Mayhew 2004). Public managers are often able to leverage this discretion to improve policy and/or agency outcomes. For instance, public managers who are looking to solve a complex problem that cannot be solved by their organization alone may decide to collaborate with actors outside of their organization who share a common interest and/or goal. This decision to collaborate can significantly impact policy outcomes and organizational performance (Meier and O'Toole 2003; Meier and Krause 2003).¹ In the US, for example, school principals and other administrators are responsible for student achievement. However, student achievement is a complex phenomenon that is driven by a number of factors within and beyond the walls of the school. Thus, if school administrators want to meaningfully improve student achievement, they may have to engage a variety of external stakeholders, such as parent-teacher associations, local business leaders and non-profit organizations that provide social services to student-aged populations (Meier and O'Toole 2006). Given the proliferation of third party actors in policy implementation throughout the public sector (Frederickson and Frederickson 2006), managers in many countries are increasingly faced with complex problems such as these that require networking and collaboration.

Because of this, scholars have examined some factors that may lead to more (less) collaboration. Several theories of collaboration, including public choice, resource dependency theory and transaction cost theory, suggest that public managers are rational actors

Thaddieus W. Conner is in the Department of Government, New Mexico State University, USA. Matthew C. Nowlin is in the Department of Political Science, College of Charleston, USA. Thomas Rabovsky is in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, USA. Joseph T. Ripberger is in the Department of Political Science, University of Oklahoma, USA.

who will collaborate in an effort to gain resources or reduce the transaction costs associated with performing the duties of the agency (Williamson 1975; Alter and Hage 1993; Bardach 1998; Bryson *et al.* 2006; Thomson and Perry 2006). Sociological explanations of multi-organizational partnerships argue that such perspectives overlook key factors including the importance of social context, trust, group dynamics and institutional norms and values that shape interactions among interconnected players (Granovetter 1985; Berry *et al.* 2004). In recent years, scholars have pushed beyond organizational factors to explore the individual-level predictors of collaboration and other kinds of managerial activity. Public administration theorists have long argued that the values of administrative actors fundamentally shape the quality and nature of the public services they provide. While there has been considerable work in recent years to measure values in the public sector like Public Service Motivation (e.g. Perry 1996; Anderfuhren-Biget *et al.* 2014; Jacobsen *et al.* 2014; Vandenabeele *et al.* 2014), we know relatively little about the role that other values play in shaping managerial behaviour in areas such as networking and collaboration.

In this manuscript we attempt to fill this lacuna by developing a theoretical framework of managerial values, with a particular focus on the link between cultural values and collaboration. Specifically, we use Cultural Theory (CT) – a prominent theory of values in multiple disciplines – to examine how public managers' motivations to collaborate are influenced by their deeply held values. Before doing so, we take a closer look at the role of values in the study of public administration. Then we briefly outline CT as a theoretical framework to explore and measure the value systems of individuals. Next, we discuss the literature on collaborative public management and outline a framework that uses CT to develop theoretical propositions regarding intrinsic motivations behind collaboration. Using data collected from surveys of American Indian education directors in New Mexico, Oklahoma and Montana, we conduct exploratory empirical work on the relationship between cultural worldviews and the motivations to collaborate. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our preliminary findings and areas for future research.

MANAGERIAL VALUES AND THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Managerial discretion is ubiquitous in the policy-making process. For a variety of reasons, politicians (particularly in the US, but also in other advanced nations) often expend considerable energy on making public speeches and appearances to debate the importance of a given policy, but ultimately craft relatively vague legislation with several important aspects of implementation left undefined (Lindblom 1959; Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; Mayhew 2004). Additionally, the complexity and uncertainty surrounding the task environment in many policy areas (such as education, crime and anti-terrorism, social welfare, natural disasters, etc.) necessitates that managers have the capacity to be flexible and adaptable so they can respond to conditions 'on the ground'. As a result, public managers often have considerable capacity to alter the effectiveness of public policy (for both good and bad), depending on the decisions they make on a daily basis (Meier 2009).

This dynamic creates a number of important questions that public administration theorists have struggled with for decades – when, how and why do managers choose to leverage their discretion and, more importantly, what factors influence the decisions they make? As shown in previous research, some of the factors that influence the decisions made by managers may include a manager's knowledge, expertise, experience and/or the mission of a manager's organization (see Rainey 2009 for a more extensive discussion). While these

variables are certainly important, we contend that a manager's values also shape the decisions they make when wielding their discretion.

At the centre of managerial decision-making are a variety of important values that shape perceptions about things such as policy goals, the cause-effect mechanisms that govern problems and their solutions, the importance of due process and rule of law, the value of diversity and equity, the deservingness of client populations and the importance of networking with other organizations and external stakeholders, among others. While public management research has long recognized the critical role that values play in administration and implementation (Friedrich 1940; Frederickson 1980; Rosenbloom 1983; Bertelli and Lynn 2006), our understanding of the kinds of values that managers hold or the impacts that such values have on decision-making and behaviour continues to evolve (see Jørgensen and Bozeman 2007; Sørensen and Torfing 2009). With the exception of Public Service Motivation (PSM) research (Perry 1996; Houston 2000; Jin 2013; Anderfuhren-Biget *et al.* 2014; Jacobsen *et al.* 2014; Meyer *et al.* 2014) and a smaller collection of recent studies on partisanship and political ideology (e.g. Bertelli and Grose 2011; Clinton *et al.* 2012; Lavertu *et al.* 2013), the vast majority of work on values in public administration has been normative in nature, rather than empirical (Meier and Krause 2003).

Furthermore, while PSM and political ideology are valuable constructs that can, to varying degrees, help explain managerial decision-making, they are also limited in important ways. PSM is primarily oriented toward understanding how values related to altruism and public service influence goal setting and goal attainment (Perry and Wise 1990). As a result, it is not always clear how we would expect managers to behave when there are multiple actions that could potentially contribute to the public good, depending on how one perceives the situation (see Bozeman and Su 2014 for a more extensive review of PSM research, as well as Vandenabeele *et al.* 2014).² Similarly conventional measures of ideology typically collapse value structures onto a single left-right dimension, which can be at odds with the multi-dimensional ways in which people view reality (Wildavsky 1987). For example, some people identify as liberal with respect to social or moral issues (i.e. generally favour progressive policies aimed at promoting personal liberty), but are conservative when it comes to economic issues (i.e. generally favour reduced government intervention in the marketplace).

Given these limitations, we argue that research on values and public management can benefit from alternative approaches. Indeed, research on political psychology and opinion formation within mass publics draws on a wide range of theoretical frameworks and perspectives (Sears *et al.* 2003). Recently, a number of scholars have begun to explore a series of more broadly based cognitive and psychological value constructs in public administration (Jørgensen and Bozeman 2007; van der Wal and van Hout 2009; Witesman and Walters 2014). Drawing on the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), we argue that values can be best understood through a three-tier structure of deep core values, policy core beliefs and secondary beliefs (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Deep core values are the most fundamental, and therefore the broadest in scope and applicable across a wide array of decision-making contexts. These values entail basic predispositions to moral and normative questions about social organization and collective action. They serve as the foundation upon which other, more specific preferences and opinions are formed, and as a result are relatively stable across time and context. However, Fischer (2003) raises an important critique of the ACF and, more specifically, the assumptions underlying policy change and the importance of core values, in that it '... neglects the social and historical context in which such change takes place' (p. 101). We acknowledge this critical point and firmly situate the

present investigation within the US historical and political context (a point to which we return in the conclusion).

Nonetheless, policy core beliefs are constrained by deep core values and centred on specific policy problems and contexts. For instance, policy core beliefs might contain a manager's general opinions about policies or programmes in a general policy domain, such as education policy, the environment or fiscal/tax policy. Finally, secondary beliefs are the narrowest and are often focused on specific mechanisms for achieving the goals of the policy core. Examples of these would include beliefs about the efficacy of a particular programme or policy intervention.

While the ACF seeks to leverage the structure of belief systems to explain the alignment and behaviour of policy actors in advocacy coalitions, we draw on the notion of deep core values to explore the extent to which these values influence the decisions that public managers make and the cognitive forces that motivate these decisions. Specifically, we apply CT, which has been prominent within literatures on risk perception and policy preferences, as a measure of deep core values that can provide useful insights for a variety of topics relevant to public management (Jenkins-Smith *et al.* 2014; Ripberger *et al.* 2014). The following sections outline the major elements of CT and its potential benefits for understanding a topic that has received considerable attention within the field of public administration: managerial collaboration and networking activities.

CULTURAL THEORY

CT was developed in the 1970s by British anthropologist Mary Douglas to explain societal conflict over risk (see e.g. Douglas 1970, 1978). Since then, CT has been used across the social sciences to explain a wide variety of social phenomena at multiple levels of analysis, ranging from the relationship between states in the international system (e.g. Verweij 1995), to organizational structure and behaviour (e.g. Gross and Rayner 1985; Thompson and Wildavsky 1986; Hood 1995, 1998) and individual perceptions, values and preferences (e.g. Wildavsky 1987; Wildavsky and Dake 1990; Jenkins-Smith and Smith 1994; Grendstad and Selle 2000; Jones 2011; Kahan *et al.* 2011; Ripberger *et al.* 2011).

A basic proposition that unites this diverse scholarship is the idea that social relations fundamentally affect the way in which individuals and groups organize and interact with one another. More importantly, advocates of CT argue that two dimensions of sociality – 'group' and 'grid' – define the extent of this social organization and interaction. They define who interacts with whom and how this interaction takes place.

The group dimension of sociality taps the degree to which 'the individual's life is absorbed in and sustained by group membership' (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, p. 202). Individuals who find themselves at the low end of the group dimension stand outside group boundaries and are identified (by themselves and others) as individualistic, autonomous actors who rely upon their own devices when making decisions. Individuals at the high end of the group dimension, by comparison, define themselves according to their group affiliations and allow the group to determine what they do and when they do it.

The grid dimension, by comparison, demarcates the degree to which individual decisions and actions are constrained by externally imposed prescriptions, such as rules, norms, laws and traditions. Like the group dimension, the grid dimension is best conceived as a continuum. Individuals at the low end of the grid continuum are bound by few (if any) societally imposed prescriptions. Their decisions and actions are guided by a logic that is internal to the individual or group, rather than external rules, norms,




FIGURE 1 *Cultural theory worldviews*

laws, etc. People at the high end of the grid continuum, by contrast, accept a number of externally imposed prescriptions. They appeal to external rules, laws and norms when making decisions, rather than internal logic or reason.

When the grid and group dimensions are overlaid, they produce the finite set of social environments depicted in figure 1 (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Thompson *et al.* 1990). The *individualist* environment is characterized by weak group boundaries and weak regulation. In this environment, social relationships are subject to negotiation and resources are subject to competition. The prototypical *hierarchical* environment, by contrast, is defined by strong group boundaries and strong regulation. In this environment, social relationships are governed by binding prescriptions and resources are allocated by authority figures to those with rank and status. The *egalitarian* environment is characterized by strong group membership but relatively few rules and regulations. In such an environment, social relationships are defined by group membership and resources are allocated by way of group deliberation because power is shared equally across group members. The *fatalist* environment is characterized by strong external prescriptions but little, if any, group membership. In this environment, individual autonomy is limited by an external authority that is unaffected by the wants or needs of those who inhabit this environment. As these perceptions and preferences solidify, individuals begin to develop a cultural bias or worldview that orients their interaction with other individuals and groups, and these worldviews become the basis for normative values about how social interactions 'should' be structured.

We hypothesize that CT can provide valuable insights for understanding how public managers approach collaborative interactions with external actors. If, as suggested by CT, public managers vary in the extent to which they subscribe to these different worldviews, it is possible that they will structure their interaction with other managers and stakeholders in noticeably different yet predictable ways. Managers who prefer egalitarian environments, for example, will look for opportunities to collaborate as often as possible, believing that everyone is better off when groups work as a team. Managers who prefer individualist environments, by comparison, will take a default position against collaboration unless it is clear that a collaborative arrangement will benefit their organization in some way

or another. Managers who hold hierarchic worldviews will position themselves somewhere in the middle – they will collaborate with other organizations as long as they believe that collaboration is one of their duties or responsibilities. Unlike their egalitarian-leaning counterparts, they will not ‘collaborate for the sake of collaboration’. As argued in the next section, these motivations to collaborate are consequential because they influence when and how managers decide to collaborate, which, in turn, influences the structure of the networks they build and, ultimately, the quality of services they provide.

COLLABORATIVE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT

Today’s public manager regularly engages in a number of activities both internal and external to the organization. One such activity that has gained increasing attention in the public administration literature concerns networking and collaboration with external stakeholders to provide joint solutions to common problems (Agranoff 2007; Ansell and Gash 2008; O’Leary and Bingham 2009). Given the ubiquitous nature of networks in the delivery of public services (Agranoff and McGuire 2003), research suggests that the time committed to managing multi-organizational arrangements has steadily increased across a number of policy areas (see, for instance, Nylén 2007; Bellamy *et al.* 2008; Moynihan 2009; Jacobs 2010). Thus, collaborative behaviour is seen as a deliberate and strategic decision on the part of public managers and organizations (Kettl 2002). Understanding what drives public managers to engage, or not engage, external actors in collaborative partnerships provides an ideal setting in which to explore and test how cultural worldviews impact managerial behaviour.

Considerable research has investigated the impacts of such complex networks and collaborative partnerships, with the expectation that such activity will result in more efficient and effective public services (Meier and O’Toole 2003; Dickinson and Sullivan 2014). Few public management studies, however, have examined the underlying motivations behind collaborative behaviour and how such motivations are determined by individual values. There are various reasons why public managers choose to initiate collaborative partnerships with different stakeholders, including the need for greater resources, the desire to foster greater trust with external stakeholders, a drive to improve organizational outcomes and performance or simply an intrinsic desire to involve various stakeholders in more participatory and democratic decision-making processes (Williamson 1975; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Kickert *et al.* 1997; 6 *et al.* 2003, 2006; Agranoff 2007; O’Leary and Bingham 2009). As a result, our understanding of collaboration draws from a wide pool of competing theoretical perspectives, ranging from economic and public choice perspectives to sociological critiques that emphasize the importance of institutional norms and social contexts in shaping networking behaviour (Berry *et al.* 2004).

Such underlying motivations – and the value dispositions that drive them – are vitally important to understanding collaborative behaviour, network structure and policy outcomes. As Meier and O’Toole (2003) argue, public managers play a key role in the nature and design of policy networks; deciding whether to collaborate, how to collaborate, for what purpose and with whom. This is not to diminish the importance of institutional and organizational-level factors in understanding cross-boundary collaboration, which studies have explored extensively over the past several decades (6 *et al.* 2007; Bellamy *et al.* 2008; Røiseland 2011).³ However, individuals within these organizations play a non-trivial role in building and sustaining meaningful partnerships that is the primary area of interest in this investigation. We argue that the decisions public officials make about collaboration are




FIGURE 2 *Theoretical framework*

guided by their core values, which has larger practical implications for both the structure and effectiveness of collaborative arrangements.

To better illustrate this connection, we present our logic in figure 2. As figure 2 illustrates, the individual values of public managers serve as the foundation for managerial decision-making on matters where they possess authority and discretion (such as engaging actors in collaborative activities). We argue that an individual's deep core values, such as those identified by CT, shape their motivations to collaborate. Such motivations then translate into actual managerial behaviour, including how much time is dedicated to networking activities compared to internal management, the way in which managers collaborate and whom public officials choose to involve in networks. Public officials, for instance, who are motivated to engage external actors by the lure of additional resources, may strategically target stakeholders that can provide such support. Conversely, other officials may seek to include all groups impacted by the organization's decisions, regardless of expected material benefit, because they perceive intangible aspects such as building trust and understanding as important goals for collaborative activities.

Such differences in individual motivation and behaviour can have important implications for the access and involvement of various societal groups in decision-making processes, shaping the very composition and outcomes of collaborative networks. As a large body of evidence suggests, it follows that both overall levels of collaboration and the very structure of networks themselves have major implications for improving policy outcomes and organizational effectiveness, as reflected in figure 2 (Milward and Provan 2000; Meier and O'Toole 2003; Nylén 2007). In sum, our theoretical argument begins with the idea that values drive motivations, which in turn determine managerial behaviour that then translates into actual policy outcomes. Thus, testing the link between values and motivations is a critical first step in broadening our understanding of collaborative behaviour in public management literature.

In the following section, we provide a brief empirical demonstration of how scholars in public administration might view collaborative motivation through the lens of individual values by embracing CT. Specifically, we explore the extent to which managerial preferences for the different cultural environments affect the likelihood that they selected 'fostering trust and mutual understanding among actors in the surrounding community' as their primary motivation for collaboration. If our theory is correct, then managers who

hold egalitarian values will strongly identify with this motivation because trust, fairness, inclusion and equality are essential elements of the social environment they endeavour to create and inhabit. Managers who tend toward individualistic values, by contrast, will be less compelled by 'trust and mutual understanding' as a motivation to collaborate in costly social arrangements. They will hold off until they are sure that the benefits of the collaborative relationship will outweigh the costs. Managers who hold hierarchic values, due to their strong affinity for group attachments, will likely see fostering trust and mutual understanding as a motivation to collaborate with multiple stakeholders. However, it is also likely that those holding hierarchic values would prefer demarcated lines of authority among these stakeholders and clear responsibility for decision-making, whereas for those holding egalitarian values consensus among stakeholders is more important for decision-making.

As we develop this demonstration, it is important to recognize that trust is a complex and multi-dimensional concept (see, for instance, 6 *et al.* 2003, 2006). First, trust can be seen as a by-product of networks, created through the act of collaborating among different organizations and individuals that serve to strengthen the bonds among actors and increase participation. This understanding of trust in the collaborative process is seen as a phenomenon that emerges over time as a result of repeated interactions between actors that helps in attaining some other larger objective. On the other hand, trust can also be seen as a goal in and of itself, existing a priori as a motivating factor to collaborate with external actors to help build better relationships with stakeholders and boost confidence in an organization. While some individuals may use the trust produced from partnerships as a way to achieve a much larger goal, others see fostering trust with stakeholders, such as parents of children enrolled in public schools, as something desirable in its own right for serving the public interest. We adopt the latter understanding of trust as a concept that prompts individuals to involve external actors in collaborative arrangements.

DATA AND METHODS

We empirically explore the relationship between cultural worldviews and collaborative motivation using data from a survey of 474 directors who oversee American Indian education programmes in New Mexico, Oklahoma and Montana public school districts. American Indian education directors are responsible for designing and overseeing programmes geared toward American Indian students served in local education agencies that receive federal Indian Education Improvement Grants as part of Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1964. Not only do these directors manage various cultural and education programmes designed to meet the unique needs of American Indian students, but directors also actively build and manage collaborative partnerships with external stakeholders, including American Indian parents and surrounding tribal governments. Thus, American Indian education directors play a pivotal role in representing the school district in its relationship with American Indian and non-American Indian communities, which includes building and sustaining partnerships seen as important to improving student outcomes (Lomawaima and McCarty 2006). Studies suggest considerable variation in the extent to which directors actively engage American Indian and non-American Indian actors in collaborative arrangements, which we argue can be understood through the lens of CT.

The survey was administered online and by mail in two waves beginning in May 2013.⁴ The survey instrument contained a battery of questions related to the frequency

TABLE 1 Mean differences between respondents and non-respondents on school district characteristics

| Variables | Respondents (N=) | Non-respondents (N=) | Difference | T-score |
|----------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|------------|---------|
| Percent free lunch | 67.7% (79) | 69.1% (375) | -1.4% | 0.62 |
| Student/teacher ratio | 14.4 (79) | 14.9 (375) | -0.5 | 0.59 |
| Percent state revenue | 52.3% (79) | 53.5% (375) | -1.2% | 0.89 |
| Revenue per pupil | \$9,800.14 (79) | \$9,745.53 (375) | \$54.61 | -0.08 |
| Percent American Indian students | 39.8% (79) | 33.9% (375) | 5.9% | -2.06 |

Source: National Center for Education Statistics (2013).

and type of collaboration that directors maintain with external stakeholders, their motivations to collaborate, their expectations about the impact of collaboration and questions about their individual background and cultural worldviews. Of the 474 public school districts surveyed, 84 responded, reflecting approximately 18 per cent of the population. Given the relatively small sample size, we explored the possibility of non-response bias by comparing school districts that participated in the survey to those that did not on several district-level measures. Table 1 shows mean differences between respondents and non-respondents on indicators such as percentage of students receiving free lunch, student-teacher ratio, the percentage of district revenues from state appropriations, revenue per pupil and the percentage of American Indian students in the district. There is little difference between respondents and non-respondents in the dataset, as evidenced by the lack of significant differences on all but one of the characteristics (percentage of American Indian students is approximately 6 per cent higher for districts that participated in the survey). While we cannot observe differences at the individual level on such measures as values and motivation, the evidence provides some support that the sample is representative of the population at large.

The primary dependent variables of interest in this preliminary analysis are motivations to collaborate. As mentioned earlier, public managers are known to collaborate for a number of reasons, including the attainment of resources and information, the construction of more participatory and inclusive processes among stakeholders and the desire to improve organizational outcomes (Ansell and Gash 2008). To capture this aspect of collaborative management, respondents were asked to rank, from 1 (highest priority for collaboration) to 6 (lowest priority for collaboration), the following motivations for engaging with various stakeholders. The results of these rankings are presented in figure 3.

- To acquire greater resources
- To foster an environment of trust and mutual understanding among stakeholders
- To promote collective decision-making/joint problem-solving
- Because it is expected of me in my current position
- To improve organizational performance and outcomes
- To decrease risk and prevent conflict




FIGURE 3 *Rankings of the motivations for collaboration*

As figure 3 indicates, most respondents ranked fostering trust and mutual understanding as the number one motivation for collaboration, with 40 ranking it as the highest priority. Improving outcomes was ranked first by 22 respondents, followed by more resources (21), joint decision-making (18), 'to decrease conflict' (6), and 'it is expected' (5). Given our expectations about the importance of trust within education policy and the fact that trust was ranked most important by a larger number of respondents, we examine the relationship between cultural type and the likelihood of choosing fostering trust as the primary motivation for collaboration. The 'fostering trust' variable was coded as dichotomous, with a 1 indicating that it was ranked first and 0 otherwise.⁵

The primary independent variables in this analysis are values as captured by individual biases or worldviews with respect to the different cultural environments.⁶ To measure these values, we construct three indices capturing egalitarian, individualist and hierarchic worldviews from nine survey items that have been developed over time by several scholars and are commonly used in studies of CT (e.g. Jones 2011; Ripberger *et al.* 2011).⁷ These items asked respondents whether they strongly disagreed (1) to strongly agreed (7) with various statements about social interactions that are consistent with the different cultural environments. The items, along with mean values, are listed in table 2. Responses were then averaged across the items, resulting in three cultural worldview scales with scores ranging from 1 to 7. The Cronbach's alpha score for the egalitarianism scale was 0.69, for individualism it was 0.64 and for the hierarchism scale it was 0.69. Based on these alpha scores, given the n size of the sample and the number of questions, these scales can be considered consistent and reliable. The distribution of each cultural worldview index, as well as the mean and standard deviation for each index, is presented in figure 4.

As the figure indicates, the hierarchical index had the highest mean, at 4.32, followed by egalitarianism and individualism at 3.78 and 3.63, respectively. In addition to cultural

TABLE 2 *Measures of cultural orientation*

| Survey Item (1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree) | Mean |
|--|------|
| Egal1 What society needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more equal. | 3.73 |
| Indiv1 Even if some people are at a disadvantage, it is best for society to let people succeed or fail on their own. | 3.45 |
| Hier1 The best way to get ahead in life is to work hard to do what you are told to do. | 4.5 |
| Egal2 Society works best if power is shared equally. | 4.26 |
| Indiv2 Even the disadvantaged should have to make their own way in the world. | 3.90 |
| Hier2 Society is in trouble because people do not obey those in authority. | 4.17 |
| Egal3 It is our responsibility to reduce differences in income between the rich and the poor. | 3.30 |
| Indiv3 We are all better off when we compete as individuals. | 3.56 |
| Hier3 Society would be much better off if we imposed strict and swift punishment on those who break the rules. | 4.3 |




FIGURE 4 *Distribution of cultural worldviews*

worldviews, we include controls for the number of years that the respondent has been at their current school (mean = 14.34) and for their level of education. On the issue of experience and tenure, Grimm and Smith (1991) find that public managers with longer tenure within their organizations are less likely to begin new collaborative endeavours, while managers who are new to the organization are more driven to engage stakeholders in the environment to better establish meaningful networks (see also Brudney *et al.* 2005). Education also influences collaborative behaviour. Managers with higher levels of formal education, according to more recent research, are more likely to collaborate in light of their enhanced skills and confidence in managing complex interorganizational arrangements, as well as their openness to change within the organization (Esteve *et al.* 2013). The education variable ranged from 1, which indicates some high school, to 7, indicating a PhD (mean = 5.3, which indicates some post-graduate education).

ANALYSIS: CULTURAL THEORY AND MOTIVATION

We explore the importance of managerial values as measured by cultural worldview on motivations to collaborate using logistic regression, which we employ because our dependent variable is dichotomous. As previously discussed, we expect the motivation

TABLE 3 *Logit estimates for trust as a motivation to collaborate by cultural type*

| | Foster trust ranked 1st |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| Intercept | -3.44* (1.78) |
| Egalitarian | 0.36* (0.20) |
| Individualist | -0.17 (0.27) |
| Hierarch | 0.39* (0.24) |
| Years at current school | 0.04* (0.02) |
| Education | 0.06 (0.22) |
| AIC | 102.34 |
| BIC | 116.08 |
| Log likelihood | -45.17 |
| Deviance | 90.34 |
| Num. obs. | 73 |

* $p < 0.1$.

to collaborate to be driven, at least in part, by the worldview held by the public manager. The results of the logit analysis are shown in table 3, and there are several notable findings.

As expected, respondents who score higher on the egalitarian index were more likely to rank fostering trust as an important motivation for collaboration than respondents who scored lower on the egalitarian scale, significant with a p value of <0.10 . The same is true for respondents who scored relatively high on the hierarchic index as compared to respondents who scored lower on that index. Individualism, on the other hand, is not a significant predictor of fostering trust as a motivation to collaborate, but is in the expected, negative, direction. Thus, as respondents score higher on the individualist index, they are less likely to be motivated by trust when engaging external stakeholders. Finally, the longer a respondent has been at their current school, the more likely they are to rank fostering trust as most important.

To better illustrate the relationship between values and motivations to collaborate, figure 5 presents the predicted probabilities for ranking trust as the top priority for each of the three cultural types. For those who scored high on the egalitarianism index (index = 7), the predicted probability of selecting fostering trust as the most important motivation was 0.74. This is in contrast to a predicted probability of just over .20 for those who scored low on the egalitarian scale. The relationship between hierarchical worldview and likelihood of ranking trust as a primary motivating factor follows a similar trend in the analysis. For directors who identified strongly with more hierarchical forms of social organization (index = 7), the predicted probability was 0.72 for ranking trust as a top priority. Although it is not statistically significant, the overall trend when moving from a low to a high score on the individualist index is in the complete opposite direction when compared to the other worldviews, which, again, is consistent with our expectations.

Although preliminary and tentative given the sample size, these findings point to connections between the values held by managers and their intrinsic motivations to




FIGURE 5 Predicted probabilities of cultural worldview and trust as a motivation to collaborate

engage in collaborative behaviour. It is important to note that these findings may not be generalizable to other cultures, countries or contexts, and that the relationships we observe here may change over time as administrators face new challenges or burdens related to collaboration. Future research, particularly in a comparative setting, is warranted to understand how widely applicable our findings are, and whether there are important nuances in other policy settings or cultural environments. Nevertheless, our findings underscore the utility of CT as a tool for exploring the relationship between a manager's values, motivations and (potentially) behaviours.

DISCUSSION AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Values play an important role in guiding the actions and decisions of public managers on a daily basis. Scholars of public administration from across the globe have spent considerable time and energy attempting to measure and classify these values, and to understand how they might impact organizational performance and policy outcomes. One aspect of public management that has gained increasing attention is the importance of collaboration and network management, which provides an ideal setting in which to test the relationship between managerial values and motivation. Previous work has demonstrated that by engaging in collaborative behaviour with external stakeholders, public managers can improve policy outcomes across multiple policy-making contexts. However, little work has examined how the values of public managers might influence collaborative motivations and behaviour.

Using CT as a measure of deep core values, we developed a promising framework for understanding collaborative public management that posited that collaborative behaviour by public managers could, in part, be explained by individual values such as those exemplified by cultural biases and worldviews. Using a small data set of American Indian education directors in three states, we demonstrated that CT provides useful guidance about why public managers engage in collaborative behaviour. In particular, our results show that managers with an affinity for egalitarianism and/or hierarchy were more likely than managers who did not identify with those values to rank 'fostering trust' as an

important motivation for collaboration, whereas managers who identified with individualistic values were less motivated by trust as a cause for collaboration.

While preliminary, these findings are consistent with the expectations posited by CT, and, more importantly, suggest that core values may orient the way in which managers approach decisions about collaboration. Nevertheless, there are a number of important limitations that should be addressed in future work. Most importantly, the relationship between deep core values, as measured by CT, needs to be examined across a wider range of public managers and across multiple policy contexts. While our results are promising, we explored the plausibility of our hypotheses using a small dataset and a narrowly defined sample of public managers. Future research should look to replicate and expand upon our findings using more data that are collected across a wider sample of managers in different contexts, cultures and countries. In addition to validating our preliminary findings, this expansion would provide interesting insight about the extent to which the relationship between values, collaboration and managerial behaviour (in general) varies across contexts, cultures and countries, as emphasized by the post-positivist perspective (Fischer 2003). Are values always important, or are there some contexts, cultures and countries in which the values of an individual manager are less influential or take on new meaning? Given the multi-dimensional nature of CT, we feel that this theoretical lens offers a versatile approach to measuring values that can help address these important questions and contribute greatly to the development of theory in multiple areas of public administration.

Additionally, future work should consider exploring the mechanisms by which values change over time. In particular, we think that the relationship between cultural values at the individual and organizational levels deserves greater attention. Such avenues for future research could make important contributions to new institutionalism in understanding the dynamic relationship between actors and institutions (Meyer 2010). For instance, how do organizational cultures or norms shape or influence the values of individual actors, and vice versa? What implications does a mismatch between the cultural values of an individual manager and the cultural disposition of their organization have for programme management and policy implementation? How does diversity (or uniformity) in individual values within a single organization impact organizational performance?

Finally, additional research is needed to complete the causal chain from motivations to collaborative behaviours and from behaviours to outcomes of interest. Establishing the link between values and motivations is a crucial first step, but understanding the linkages between values and behaviours is equally important. We hypothesize that there is a link between cultural values and behaviours (even if only indirectly through motivations); however, the extent to which values affect outcomes is likely a function of the amount of discretion afforded to public managers, which varies across contexts, cultures and countries. In an environment where discretion is limited, the majority of a manager's behaviour is prescribed and values may not play a major part in the decision-making process. As we complete this causal chain, we hope to outline a broader framework of managerial values that accounts for all types of managerial actions. While collaboration with external stakeholders is vital, managers also engage in the internal management of their organization, and it is likely that cultural values influence how managers deal with those internal dynamics. We believe that specifying and empirically testing such a framework will bring us one step closer to understanding when, how and why managers choose to leverage their discretion and, more importantly, the individual-level factors influencing the decisions they make.

NOTES

- ¹ Terms such as interagency collaboration (Nylen 2007), governance networks (Sørensen and Torfing 2009), and 'joined up' government (6 2004) have been used to describe the concept of 'collaboration'. We use O'Leary and Bingham's (2009, p. 7) definition of collaboration as 'the process of facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved or easily solved by single organizations'.
- ² A recent Special Issue on PSM in *Public Administration* makes considerable progress in this area. For instance, Anderfuhren-Biget *et al.* (2014) demonstrate how different policy contexts shape different types of motivation. The authors build on earlier work by Perry (1996) that identifies four areas of PSM including compassion, commitment to the public interest, self-sacrifice and attraction to politics. The authors find that employees in positions that deal with welfare policy, for example, are more likely to be motivated by compassion than other types of motivation. We feel that this research presents interesting opportunities to explore the diverse landscape of motivations in the public sector that could incorporate theories of cultural worldview.
- ³ For instance, Bellamy *et al.* (2008) use neo-Durkheimian institutional theory to understand how different social environments impact information-sharing practices across a wide range of multi-agency arrangements. They conceptualize different institutional forms based on the degree of social integration and social regulation present in a particular setting similar in nature to the grid/group dimensions used in this investigation.
- ⁴ Using a bi-modal approach to collecting survey data introduces potential threats to validity, as documented in the literature on survey methodology (see de Leeuw 2005). To test for the potential presence of bias in the results, we ran the models using a control variable for whether or not a respondent completed the survey online or by mail. The control variable for survey mode was not significant in the models, which indicates that the survey modes did not influence respondent answers.
- ⁵ A number of respondents, 13, gave the same rankings to one or more of the choices. Given that we are considering whether the respondents ranked fostering trust as first or not, we included those respondents since they provided an indication of what motivations they considered to be important.
- ⁶ We also recognize the concern for common source bias in the present study given that both the primary dependent and independent variables of interest are derived from the same survey instrument. However, gathering information on deep core values and collaborative motivations is rather difficult using alternative methods such as direct observation for comparison. For these reasons we rely on survey responses to observe the relationships of interest and stress an admonishment of caution when interpreting the results.
- ⁷ As with previous studies on CT using survey data, we exclude fatalists because they compose a relatively small portion of the population. In fact, the mean score on the fatalist index was 2.63, representing the lowest mean score out of all four worldviews. For these reasons we focus on three cultural worldviews: egalitarianism, individualism and hierarchism.

REFERENCES

- 6, P. 2004. 'Joined-up Government in the Western World in Comparative Perspective: A Preliminary Literature Review and Exploration', *Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory*, 14, 1, 103–38.
- 6, P., C. Bellamy, C. Raab, A. Warren and C. Heeney. 2007. 'Institutional Shaping of Interagency Working: Managing Tensions between Collaborative Working and Client Confidentiality', *Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory*, 17, 3, 405–34.
- 6, P., N. Goodwin, E. Peck and T. Freeman. 2006. *Managing Networks of Twenty-First Century Organizations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- 6, P., D. Leat, K. Seltzer and G. Stoker. 2003. *Towards Holistic Governance: The New Reform Agenda*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Agranoff, R. 2007. *Managing Within Networks: Adding Value to Public Organizations*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Agranoff, R. and M. McGuire. 2003. *Collaborative Public Management: New Strategies for Local Governments*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Alter, C. and J. Hage. 1993. *Organizations Working Together*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
- Anderfuhren-Biget, S., F. Varone and D. Giaque. 2014. 'Policy Environment and Public Service Motivation', *Public Administration*, 92, 4, 807–25.
- Ansell, C. and A. Gash. 2008. 'Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice', *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 18, 4, 543–71.
- Bardach, E. 1998. *Getting Agencies to Work Together: The Practice and Theory of Managerial Craftsmanship*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Bellamy, C., P. 6, C. Raab, A. Warren and C. Heeney. 2008. 'Information-Sharing and Confidentiality in Social Policy: Regulating Multi-Agency Working', *Public Administration*, 86, 3, 737–59.
- Berry, F.S., R.S. Brower, S.O. Choi, W.X. Goa, H.S. Jang, M. Kwon *et al.* 2004. 'Three Traditions of Network Research: What the Public Management Research Agenda Can Learn from Other Research Communities', *Public Administration Review*, 64, 5, 539–52.

- Bertelli, A.M. and C.R. Grose. 2011. 'The Lengthened Shadow of Another Institution? Ideal Point Estimates for the Executive Branch and Congress', *American Journal of Political Science*, 55, 4, 767–81.
- Bertelli, A.M. and L.E. Lynn. 2006. *Madison's Managers: Public Administration and the Constitution*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Bozeman, B. and X. Su. 2014. 'Public Service Motivation Concepts and Theory: A Critique', *Public Administration Review*. doi: 10.1111/puar.12248
- Brudney, J.L., S. Fernandez, J. Ryu and D. Wright. 2005. 'Exploring and Explaining Contracting Out: Patterns Among the American States', *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 15, 3, 393–419.
- Bryson, J.M., B.C. Crosby and M.M. Stone. 2006. 'The Design and Implementation of Cross-Sector Collaborations: Propositions from the Literature', *Public Administration Review*, 66, s1, 44–55.
- Clinton, J.D., A. Bertelli, C.R. Grose, D.E. Lewis and D. Nixon. 2012. 'Separated Powers in the United States: The Ideology of Agencies, Presidents, and Congress', *American Journal of Political Science*, 56, 2, 341–54.
- de Leeuw, E.D. 2005. 'To Mix or Not to Mix Data Collection Modes in Surveys', *Journal of Official Statistics*, 21, 2, 233–55.
- Dickinson, H., and H. Sullivan. 2014. 'Towards a General Theory of Collaborative Performance: The Importance of Efficacy and Agency', *Public Administration*, 92, 1, 161–77.
- Douglas, M. 1970. *Natural Symbols*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Douglas, M. 1978. 'Cultural Bias'. Royal Anthropological Institute Occasional Paper No. 35. London.
- Douglas, M. and A. Wildavsky. 1982. *Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Epstein, D. and S. O'Halloran. 1999. *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Esteve, M. 2013. 'Organizational Collaboration in the Public Sector: Do Chief Executives Make a Difference?', *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 23, 4, 927–52.
- Fischer, F. 2003. *Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Frederickson, H.G. 1980. *New Public Administration*. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.
- Frederickson, D.G. and H.G. Frederickson. 2006. *Measuring the Performance of the Hollow State*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Friedrich, C. 1940. 'Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility', in C.J. Friedrich and E.S. Mason (eds), *Public Policy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 3–24.
- Granovetter, M. 1985. 'Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness', *American Journal of Sociology*, 91, 3, 481–510.
- Grendstad, G. and P. Selle. 2000. 'Cultural Myths of Human and Physical Nature: Integrated or Separated?', *Risk Analysis*, 20, 1, 27–40.
- Grimm, C.M. and K.G. Smith. 1991. 'Management and Organizational Change: A Note on the Railroad Industry', *Strategic Management Journal*, 12, 7, 557–62.
- Gross, J.L. and S. Rayner. 1985. *Measuring Culture: A Paradigm for the Analysis of Social Organization*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hood, C. 1995. 'The "New Public Management" in the 1980s: Variations on a Theme', *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, 20, 2, 93–109.
- Hood, C. 1998. *The Art of the State: Culture, Rhetoric, and Public Management*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Houston, D.J. 2000. 'Public-Service Motivation: A Multivariate Test', *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 10, 4, 713–28.
- Jacobs, K. 2010. 'The Politics of Partnerships: A Study of Police and Housing Collaboration to Tackle Anti-Social Behaviour on Australian Public Housing Estates', *Public Administration*, 88, 4, 928–42.
- Jacobsen, C.B., J. Hvitved and L.B. Andersen. 2014. 'Command and Motivation: How the Perception of External Interventions Relates to Intrinsic Motivation and Public Service Motivation', *Public Administration* 92, 4, 790–806.
- Jenkins-Smith, H.C. and W.K. Smith. 1994. 'Ideology, Culture, and Risk Perception', in D.J. Coyle and R.J. Ellis (eds), *Politics, Policy, and Culture*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 17–32.
- Jenkins-Smith, H., C.L. Silva, K. Gupta and J.T. Ripberger. 2014. 'Belief System Continuity and Change in Policy Advocacy Coalitions: Using Cultural Theory to Specify Belief Systems, Coalitions, and Sources of Change', *Policy Studies Journal*, 42, 4, 484–508.
- Jin, M. 2013. 'Public Service Motivation: A Cross-Country Study', *International Journal of Public Administration*, 36, 5, 331–43.
- Jones, M.D. 2011. 'Leading the Way to Compromise? Cultural Theory and Climate Change Opinion', *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 44, 4, 720–25.
- Jørgensen, T.B. and B. Bozeman. 2007. 'Public Values: An Inventory', *Administration & Society*, 39, 3, 354–81.
- Kahan, D.M., H. Jenkins-Smith and D. Braman. 2011. 'Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus', *Journal of Risk Research*, 14, 2, 147–74.

- Kettl, D.F. 2002. *The Transformation of Governance: Public Administration for Twenty-First Century America*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Kickert, W., E. Klijn and J. Koppenjan. 1997. *Managing Complex Networks: Strategies for the Public Sector*. Irvine, CA: Sage.
- Lavertu, S., D.E. Lewis and D.P. Moynihan. 2013. 'Government Reform, Political Ideology, and Administrative Burden: The Case of Performance Management in the Bush Administration', *Public Administration Review*, 73, 6, 845–57.
- Lindblom, C.E. 1959. 'The Science of "Muddling Through"', *Public Administration Review*, 19, 2, 79–88.
- Lomawaima, T.K. and T.L. McCarty. 2006. *To Remain An Indian: Lessons in Democracy from a Century of Native American Education*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Mayhew, D.R. 2004. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, 2nd edn. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Meier, K.J. 2009. 'Policy Theory, Policy Theory Everywhere: Ravings of a Deranged Policy Scholar', *Policy Studies Journal*, 37, 1, 5–11.
- Meier, K.J. and G.A. Krause. 2003. 'The Scientific Study of Bureaucracy: An Overview', in G.A. Krause and K.J. Meier (eds), *Politics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Public Bureaucracy*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, pp. 1–19.
- Meier, K.J. and L. O'Toole. 2003. 'Public Management and Educational Performance: The Impact of Managerial Networking', *Public Administration Review*, 63, 6, 689–99.
- Meier, K.J. and L.J. O'Toole. 2006. *Bureaucracy in a Democratic State: A Governance Perspective*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Meyer, J.W. 2010. 'World Society, Institutional Theories, and the Actor', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 36, 1, 1–20.
- Meyer, R.E., I. Egger-Peitler, M.A. Höllerer and G. Hammerschmid. 2014. 'Of Bureaucrats and Passionate Public Managers: Institutional Logics, Executive Identities, and Public Service Motivation', *Public Administration*, 92, 4, 861–85.
- Milward, H.B. and K.G. Provan. 2000. 'Governing the Hollow State', *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 10, 2, 359–79.
- Moynihan, D.P. 2009. 'The Network Governance of Crisis Response: Case Studies of Incident Command Systems', *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 19, 4, 895–915.
- National Center for Education Statistics. 2013. *Elementary and Secondary Information System*. Retrieved 15 April 2014 from <http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/elsi/>.
- Nylén, U. 2007. 'Interagency Collaboration in Human Services: Impact of Formalization and Intensity on Effectiveness', *Public Administration*, 85, 1, 143–66.
- O'Leary, R. and L.B. Bingham. 2009. *The Collaborative Public Manager: New Ideas for the Twenty First Century*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Perry, J.L. 1996. 'Measuring Public Service Motivation: An Assessment of Construct Reliability and Validity', *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 6, 1, 5–22.
- Perry, J.L. and L.R. Wise. 1990. 'The Motivational Bases of Public Service', *Public Administration Review*, 50, 3, 367–73.
- Pfeffer, J. and G. Salancik. 1978. *The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Rainey, H.G. 2009. *Understanding and Managing Public Organizations*, 4th edn. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Ripberger, J.T., H.C. Jenkins-Smith and K.G. Herron. 2011. 'How Cultural Orientations Create Shifting National Security Coalitions on Nuclear Weapons and Terrorist Threats in the American Public', *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 44, 4, 715–19.
- Ripberger, J.T., K. Gupta, C.L. Silva and H.C. Jenkins-Smith. 2014. 'Cultural Theory and the Measurement of Deep Core Beliefs Within the Advocacy Coalition Framework', *Policy Studies Journal*, 42, 4, 509–27.
- Røiseland, A. 2011. 'Understanding Local Governance: Institutional Forms of Collaboration', *Public Administration*, 89, 3, 879–93.
- Rosenbloom, D.H. 1983. 'Public Administrative Theory and the Separation of Powers', *Public Administration Review*, 43, 3, 219–27.
- Sabatier, P.A. and H.C. Jenkins-Smith. 1993. *Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Sears, D.O., L. Huddy and R. Jervis. 2003. *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sørensen, E. and J. Torfing. 2009. 'Making Governance Networks Effective and Democratic through Metagovernance', *Public Administration*, 87, 2, 234–58.
- Thompson, A.M. and J.L. Perry. 2006. 'Collaboration Processes: Inside the Blackbox', *Public Administration Review*, 66, s1, 20–32.
- Thompson, M. and A. Wildavsky. 1986. 'A Cultural Theory of Information Bias in Organizations', *Journal of Management Studies*, 23, 3, 273–86.
- Thompson, M., R. Ellis and A. Wildavsky. 1990. *Cultural Theory*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Vandenabeele, W., G.A. Brewer and A. Ritz. 2014. 'Past, Present, and Future of Public Service Motivation Research', *Public Administration*, 92, 4, 779–89.

- Van der Wal, Z. and E.T.J. van Hout. 2009. 'Is Public Value Pluralism Paramount? The Intrinsic Multiplicity and Hybridity of Public Values', *International Journal of Public Administration*, 32, 3–4, 220–31.
- Verweij, M. 1995. 'Cultural Theory and the Study of International Relations', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 24, 1, 87–111.
- Wildavsky, A. 1987. 'Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation', *American Political Science Review*, 81, 1, 4–21.
- Wildavsky, A. and K. Dake. 1990. 'Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears What and Why?', *Daedalus*, 119, 4, 41–60.
- Williamson, O.E. 1975. *Markets and Hierarchies, Analysis and Antitrust Implications: A Study in the Economics of Internal Organization*. New York: Free Press.
- Witesman, E.M. and L.C. Walters. 2014. 'Modeling Public Decision Preferences Using Context-Specific Value Hierarchies', *American Review of Public Administration*, 45, 1, 86–105.