Matthew C. Nowlin
Associate Professor of Political Science
University of Texas at Arlington
Matthew C. Nowlin is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Texas at Arlington. He studies public policy, with a focus on environmental and energy policy and politics — how policy actors and the public form beliefs, learn, and respond to issues such as climate change, nuclear waste, and natural hazards.
Research Areas
Theories of the Policy Process 11
How policy changes and how policy actors learn: the Advocacy Coalition Framework, policy learning as belief updating, information processing, policy feedback, and implementation.
- . 2024. “Policy Beliefs, Belief Uncertainty, and Policy Learning Through the Lens of the Advocacy Coalition Framework.” Policy and Politics, 52(4): 675–695.Publisher’s Version
Abstract
Within the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), policy-oriented learning is understood as a change in policy beliefs. Additional work has noted that belief reinforcement, not just belief change, is also a potential policy learning outcome. Yet, little work has attempted to reconcile how learning could involve both belief change and belief reinforcement. In this article, I propose a policy-oriented learning model where policy beliefs – deep core, policy core, or secondary aspects – are understood as having a distribution with a central tendency (that is, the belief) as well as variance (that is, certainty associated with the belief). With policy beliefs considered as distributions, learning can be understood as changes in beliefs (that is, a change in the central tendency) as well as changes in certainty (that is, variance), and conversely, a decrease in belief uncertainty would constitute belief reinforcement. Using data from a deliberative forum that brought together various stakeholders including experts, natural resource managers, and the public to discuss environmental issues impacting coastal communities, I explore policy-oriented learning as changes in concern regarding several key issues before and after the forum. Additionally, I examine the association between concern following the forum and self-reported learning. I find support for the proposed policy-oriented learning model as shown by significant changes in average concern as well as average variance among participants across several of the issues discussed. In this way, the article makes a theoretical contribution to the ACF literature by testing the use of distributions to assess policy learning. - . 2021. “Policy Learning and Information Processing.” Policy Studies Journal, 49(4): 1019–1039.Publisher’s VersionCode (GitHub)
Abstract
Policy learning is an important concept in the study of policymaking, yet it is difficult to model and empirically estimate. Additionally, work on policy learning has not fully drawn from the work on information processing in the policy process. In this paper, I propose a model of policy learning that incorporates the Advocacy Coalition Framework’s notion of policy-oriented learning and the theory of disproportionate information processing within a Bayesian learning framework. Policy learning through Bayesian updating occurs as individuals adjust their prior beliefs in light of new information, and in the approach posited here, learning is a function of the strength of prior beliefs and the weight given to new information. Additionally, learning is thought to occur only when subsequent beliefs move in the direction of the information. Then, I demonstrate the policy learning model using public opinion data about Yucca Mountain, a proposed repository site for nuclear waste. Finally, I conclude with suggesting ways in which the policy learning model can be incorporated into current policy learning theories and frameworks. - . 2019. “Environmental Policymaking in an Era of Climate Change.” New York, NY: Routledge.
- . 2011. “Theories of the Policy Process: State of the Research and Emerging Trends.” Policy Studies Journal, 39(s1): 41–60.Publisher’s Version
Abstract
Over the last two decades many alternate theories of the policy process have been developed. This essay covers recent scholarship (from 2008 to 2010) regarding the major policy process theories. In addition, several recent trends in research are discussed including; the use of narrative in policy theory, issues that cross multiple subsystems, bureaucracy in the policy process, and synthesizing multiple theories and frameworks. - . 2026. “Beliefs Updating Through Information Processing.” In Handbook of Policy Learning, eds. Claudio M. Radaelli and Bishoy L. Zaki. Edward Elgar Publishing, 193–204.Publisher’s Version
Abstract
Policy learning is a key element of policymaking processes, and there is a wide array of approaches to understand policy learning and its effects on public policy. This chapter explores nascent policy learning through the information processing model. The model combines belief systems and policy-oriented learning from the Advocacy Coalition Framework with insights on information processing from Punctuated Equilibrium Theory. Additionally, the model utilizes a Bayesian approach where policy learning is understood as belief updating following the processing of information. In the model, beliefs are understood as distributions with a central tendency, the belief, and variance, or uncertainty about the belief. Information is processed relative to prior beliefs, and the possible outcomes of information processing include no learning, belief decay (an increase in uncertainty), belief reinforcement (a decrease in uncertainty), and belief change (a significant shift in the central tendency of the belief). The chapter discusses the model, its applications, and areas for future research.
Cultural Theory and Political Beliefs 10
Belief systems and worldviews — particularly the cultural theory of risk — and how they shape partisanship, policy attitudes, trust, and perceptions of risk.
- . 2022. “Who Should ‘Do More’ about Climate Change? Cultural Theory, Polycentricity, and Public Support for Climate Change Actions across Actors and Governments.” Review of Policy Research, 39(4): 468–485.Publisher’s Version
Abstract
Under a polycentric approach to climate change, action is taken at different scales and across all levels of government and sectors of society. Some scholars have argued that such an approach is the best lens to view the governance of climate change and that a polycentric approach has advantages in addressing collective-action problems. However, taking a polycentric approach would require public support for action at multiple scales. The issue of climate change is polarized across political beliefs and cultural worldviews and little research has examined how the public views climate action at one level of government relative to others as well as relative to actions by the private sector and by individuals. Using an original survey of the US public from October 2017, I explore who it is that the public thinks should ‘do more’ about climate change and the role that the cultural worldviews posited by cultural theory—hierarchical, egalitarian, individualist, and fatalist—plays in shaping those opinions. Overall, I find support for multiple actors doing more to address climate change, but with differences in support between egalitarians and individualists for actors overall and for the federal government in particular. - . 2020. “A Cultural Theory of Partisanship and Policy Attitudes.” Social Science Quarterly, 101(2): 878–892.Publisher’s Version
Abstract
Objective: Political parties provide an important function for a public that is generally seen as not consistently ideological by guiding its thinking about policy issues. In this article, we examine whether the four cultural worldviews derived from grid-group cultural theory—hierarch, egalitarian, individualist, and fatalist—are predictive of partisan attachments and perceptions of climate change risk among the public. Methods Data come from an original survey of the U.S. public conducted in 2011 and 2012. We use regression analysis to examine partisanship and perceived climate change risk; ordered logit to examine party attachment; and mediation analysis to examine the mediating effect of partisanship on cultural worldviews and climate change risk. Results We find that the group-oriented cultural types (egalitarians and hierarchs) are more likely to have stronger party attachments than the nongroup-oriented cultural types (individualists and fatalists). In addition, we find that the mediation effect of party is more pronounced among the group-oriented types than the nongroup oriented. Conclusion Grid-group cultural theory is predictive of both partisanship and policy attitudes and partisanship mediates the influence of cultural worldviews on climate change risk, particularly for those types with group orientations. - . 2026. “What Beliefs Are Central in the Climate Change Belief System Network?.” Social Science Quarterly, 107(5): e70202.Publisher’s VersionCode (GitHub)
Abstract
Objective: Climate change is one of the most polarized issues among the US public, and the beliefs that divide the public –cultural worldviews, political ideology, environmental orientation, perceived scientific consensus, and climate policy preferences – form an interconnected belief system. Belief systems have historically been understood as having a hierarchical structure, in which abstract, deep core beliefs constrain policy core and secondary beliefs. Recent work suggests that such a system can be understood as a network, in which beliefs are nodes, edges represent the relationships between them, and centrality captures a belief’s structural importance. This paper asks which climate change beliefs are most central, and whether the answer depends on how the belief system is modeled. Methods: I use original survey data from a quota-based sample of 1,129 US residents collected in October 2017. Over the same 17 belief nodes, I estimate the belief system as both an undirected network, using a Gaussian graphical model, and a directed network, using a Bayesian network learned with hill-climbing, tabu search, and constraint-based algorithms. Structural importance is measured with bootstrapped betweenness, closeness, and strength centrality in the undirected model, and with out-degree and Markov blanket size in the directed model. Results: Structural importance cuts across the deep core, policy core, and secondary belief hierarchy that theory predicts. Individualism, perceived climate risk, and support for an international agreement are robustly central regardless of whether the network is modeled as undirected or directed, and support for an international agreement occupies the most upstream position in the directed network. Egalitarianism ranks highest on betweenness and closeness in the undirected network yet is peripheral in the directed one. Political ideology, partisanship, and perceived scientific consensus rank low on nearly every measure in both models. Conclusions: A belief’s structural importance likely depends on both the type of belief and modeling assumptions, complicating any single account of how climate change beliefs are organized. Rather than replacing the hierarchical approach common in policy process research, a network approach likely offers additional analytic leverage, particularly when undirected and directed models are estimated together. - . 2026. “Cultural Theory, Political Ideology, and Burden Tolerance: The Role of Core Beliefs in Shaping Support for Administrative Burdens.” The American Review of Public Administration, Forthcoming.Publisher’s Version
Abstract
Administrative burdens embedded within many public policies are often politically contentious, such that core values and belief systems can drive either support or opposition. In this paper, we use survey data from US respondents to replicate and extend previous research on the public acceptance of administrative burdens in general. First, we confirm the measure’s validity by examining its effects on beliefs across policies that range from highly polarized to less politically contentious. Second, we test the relationship between tolerance of administrative burden and cultural theory (CT) variables that tap into worldview orientations related to hierarchy, egalitarianism, individualism, and fatalism, which previous research has found predictive of policy preferences across a wide range of domains, even after accounting for political ideology and partisanship. We hypothesize that egalitarians and individualists will generally be less tolerant of burdens, while hierarchs will be more accepting of burdensome requirements. However, this effect varies depending on the nature of the burdens and how they relate to perceived threats for each worldview. - . 2026. “Behaving Sustainably: Cultural Cognition, Environmental Orientation, and Pro-Environmental Behavior.” Sustainability, 18(17): 8883.Publisher’s VersionCode (GitHub)
Abstract
Scholars have long noted an “attitude–behavior gap” which reflects an incomplete understanding of how values and beliefs translate into pro-environmental action. This study develops and tests a conceptual model in which cultural worldviews along grid (hierarchy-egalitarianism) and group (individualism-communitarianism) dimensions shape environmental orientations, which in turn drive pro-environmental behavior. Environmental orientation is treated as having a cognitive component, measured by the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP), and an affective component, measured by the Connectedness to Nature Scale (CNS). Using survey data from 501 US adults collected online in July 2017, we estimate a Structural Equation Model (SEM) to test direct, indirect, and mediated relationships among cultural worldviews, the NEP, the CNS, and a 12-item self-reported behavior scale. Results showed hierarchical individualists held weaker ecological worldviews, while egalitarian communitarians held stronger ecological worldviews and felt more connected to nature. Both the NEP and CNS were positively associated with behavior, with the CNS showing the stronger relationship. Cultural worldviews had no significant direct effect on behavior; rather, their influence operated entirely through environmental orientations. These findings indicate that cultural worldviews shape pro-environmental behavior indirectly, mediated by cognitive and especially affective environmental orientations, helping to explain part of the attitude–behavior gap.
Climate Change and Energy Policy 22
Public opinion about climate change and energy, support for carbon pricing, and the politics of U.S. climate and energy policy.
- . 2022. “Who Should ‘Do More’ about Climate Change? Cultural Theory, Polycentricity, and Public Support for Climate Change Actions across Actors and Governments.” Review of Policy Research, 39(4): 468–485.Publisher’s Version
Abstract
Under a polycentric approach to climate change, action is taken at different scales and across all levels of government and sectors of society. Some scholars have argued that such an approach is the best lens to view the governance of climate change and that a polycentric approach has advantages in addressing collective-action problems. However, taking a polycentric approach would require public support for action at multiple scales. The issue of climate change is polarized across political beliefs and cultural worldviews and little research has examined how the public views climate action at one level of government relative to others as well as relative to actions by the private sector and by individuals. Using an original survey of the US public from October 2017, I explore who it is that the public thinks should ‘do more’ about climate change and the role that the cultural worldviews posited by cultural theory—hierarchical, egalitarian, individualist, and fatalist—plays in shaping those opinions. Overall, I find support for multiple actors doing more to address climate change, but with differences in support between egalitarians and individualists for actors overall and for the federal government in particular. - . 2020. “Revenue Use and Public Support for a Carbon Tax.” Environmental Research Letters, 15(8).Publisher’s VersionCode (GitHub)
Abstract
Many experts see carbon pricing as an effective way to reduce emissions of greenhouses gases; however, political and public support for carbon pricing has faltered. Recent research indicates that revenue recycling and policy design options may induce public support for carbon pricing, but does not examine change in support as a result of revenue use or possible heterogeneity in these inducements across partisan groups. Does support for a carbon tax shift significantly once revenue uses are discussed? Do conservatives and Republicans and liberals and Democrats respond to different revenue reuse options when formulating opinions about carbon taxation? This study employs a survey experiment to examine these questions. Key results indicate that support shifts are largest when the revenue would be refunded and conservatives and Republicans are responsive to different revenue usage options. Specifically, conservatives and Republicans are more supportive of a carbon tax when revenues go towards a tax rebate or deficit reduction. While the differences are relatively small and variable (uncertain), these results provide suggestive insight into the policy design options that may induce a bipartisan basis of public support for carbon taxation policies. - . 2019. “Tracking the Nuclear ‘Mood’ in the United States: Introducing a Long-Term Measure of Public Opinion about Nuclear Energy Using Aggregate Survey Data.” Energy Policy, 133.Publisher’s Version
Abstract
This study uses aggregate polling data to develop and validate a new measure of public support for nuclear energy that allows for the identification of factors that influence the evolution of opinion over relatively long periods of time. In addition to focusing events, such as a significant accident, this new measure shows that energy security risk has consistently driven support for nuclear energy in the US. When oil, gas, and coal were relatively expensive and scarce, support for nuclear energy went up, and when they were relatively inexpensive and abundant, it fell. This finding adds important nuance to our understanding of public support for nuclear energy in the past, and the prospects for a new “nuclear renaissance” in the future1. - . 2019. “Environmental Policymaking in an Era of Climate Change.” New York, NY: Routledge.
- . 2026. “What Beliefs Are Central in the Climate Change Belief System Network?.” Social Science Quarterly, 107(5): e70202.Publisher’s VersionCode (GitHub)
Abstract
Objective: Climate change is one of the most polarized issues among the US public, and the beliefs that divide the public –cultural worldviews, political ideology, environmental orientation, perceived scientific consensus, and climate policy preferences – form an interconnected belief system. Belief systems have historically been understood as having a hierarchical structure, in which abstract, deep core beliefs constrain policy core and secondary beliefs. Recent work suggests that such a system can be understood as a network, in which beliefs are nodes, edges represent the relationships between them, and centrality captures a belief’s structural importance. This paper asks which climate change beliefs are most central, and whether the answer depends on how the belief system is modeled. Methods: I use original survey data from a quota-based sample of 1,129 US residents collected in October 2017. Over the same 17 belief nodes, I estimate the belief system as both an undirected network, using a Gaussian graphical model, and a directed network, using a Bayesian network learned with hill-climbing, tabu search, and constraint-based algorithms. Structural importance is measured with bootstrapped betweenness, closeness, and strength centrality in the undirected model, and with out-degree and Markov blanket size in the directed model. Results: Structural importance cuts across the deep core, policy core, and secondary belief hierarchy that theory predicts. Individualism, perceived climate risk, and support for an international agreement are robustly central regardless of whether the network is modeled as undirected or directed, and support for an international agreement occupies the most upstream position in the directed network. Egalitarianism ranks highest on betweenness and closeness in the undirected network yet is peripheral in the directed one. Political ideology, partisanship, and perceived scientific consensus rank low on nearly every measure in both models. Conclusions: A belief’s structural importance likely depends on both the type of belief and modeling assumptions, complicating any single account of how climate change beliefs are organized. Rather than replacing the hierarchical approach common in policy process research, a network approach likely offers additional analytic leverage, particularly when undirected and directed models are estimated together.
Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Waste 7
Public acceptance of nuclear energy and nuclear waste facilities, trust in decision-makers, and the politics of nuclear waste management.
- . 2026. “Deciding Who Decides: Trust and Support for Elected Official, Expert, and Citizen Decision-Making Regarding Nuclear Waste Management.” Review of Policy Research, 43(1).Publisher’s Version
Abstract
Many policy issues, such as nuclear waste management, are complex and require expertise to address. In many such policy areas, decisions are made by elected officials with input largely from experts and not the public or other stakeholders. However, such top-down approaches can create mistrust and political opposition. In the case of nuclear waste management in the United States, the selection of a single waste repository (Yucca Mountain in Nevada) by Congress led to strong opposition, stagnation, and an eventual call for a participatory, consent-based siting approach to determine the location for a nuclear waste repository. While consent-based siting is appealing, it is not clear if the public, broadly speaking, would support a participatory approach or an expert-driven approach regarding nuclear waste management. In this paper, we examine public trust and public preferences for policy influence among elected officials, experts, and citizens. Specifically, we develop and test a theoretical framework that posits that the various cultural worldviews—hierarchy, egalitarianism, individualism, and fatalism—shape trust in policy actors and that cultural worldviews and trust shape which policy actors the public believes should influence nuclear waste policymaking. Overall, we find the public trusts citizens and experts more than the government and elected officials. Additionally, we find that the public thinks experts should have more influence on nuclear waste policy than citizens or elected officials. Finally, regarding cultural worldviews, hierarchs tended to trust experts and elected officials and support their influence, whereas egalitarians tended to trust citizens and support their influence. - . 2019. “Tracking the Nuclear ‘Mood’ in the United States: Introducing a Long-Term Measure of Public Opinion about Nuclear Energy Using Aggregate Survey Data.” Energy Policy, 133.Publisher’s Version
Abstract
This study uses aggregate polling data to develop and validate a new measure of public support for nuclear energy that allows for the identification of factors that influence the evolution of opinion over relatively long periods of time. In addition to focusing events, such as a significant accident, this new measure shows that energy security risk has consistently driven support for nuclear energy in the US. When oil, gas, and coal were relatively expensive and scarce, support for nuclear energy went up, and when they were relatively inexpensive and abundant, it fell. This finding adds important nuance to our understanding of public support for nuclear energy in the past, and the prospects for a new “nuclear renaissance” in the future1. - . 2023. “Technical Issues and Engagement Processes: Support for Citizen and Expert Deliberation Regarding the Management of Nuclear Waste.” Frontiers in Communication, 8.Publisher’s Version
Abstract
Deliberative forums have been increasingly used to involve citizens in policymaking, but it is unclear whether people trust their fellow citizens to make decisions in highly technical areas like nuclear policy relative to more commonly used expert bodies. We examine public support for citizen and expert deliberation regarding the siting of nuclear waste facilities and note the role of values, views on deliberation, and civic experiences on support for each type of deliberation. We find that past civic experiences are associated with increased support for citizen decision-making. In addition, we find that underlying views on nuclear power may be more important in shaping support for a decision on nuclear waste facility siting than attitudes toward particular kinds of governance processes. - . 2019. “‘Hot Rocks that Shoot Ghost Bullets’: Native American Perceptions of a Nuclear Waste Facility.” Politics, Groups, and Identities, 7(1): 21–38.Publisher’s VersionCode (GitHub)
Abstract
Environmental justice concerns are raised when environmental risks and hazards are inequitably distributed across society. Native American populations have long been at the center of environmental justice disputes, however relatively little quantitative research has examined how Native Americans view the risks related to the siting of a potentially hazardous facility. Combining 35 statewide surveys collected from 1990 to 2001, the following study explores the risk perceptions of Native American populations in New Mexico regarding the storage of nuclear waste. We find that Native Americans tend to have higher perceptions of risk regarding the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility than white respondents. We also explore variation within self-identified Native American respondents and find that older males tended to perceive less risk associated with WIPP and Native American respondents in counties with Navajo reservations tended to perceive more risk. These findings help in understanding how Native Americans perceive risk as it relates to environmental and energy issues. - . 2016. “Policy Change, Policy Feedback, and Interest Mobilization: The Politics of Nuclear Waste Management.” Review of Policy Research, 33(1): 51–70.Publisher’s VersionCode (GitHub)
Abstract
Many of the leading theories of the policy process are aimed at providing insights into the factors that make policy change more (or less) likely. In general, policy change is seen as a result of shifting dynamics within policy subsystems. However, building on theories of policy feedback and interest mobilization, this article examines whether policy change, apart from being an effect of subsystem dynamics, can be a cause of shifting dynamics as latent actors are motivated to participate in the subsystem as a result of policy change. Two hypotheses regarding post-policy change mobilization are developed and tested using data on participation in congressional hearings concerning the management of nuclear waste. The findings suggest that policy change can activate latent policy actors, specifically those actors that view themselves as “losing” as a result of the policy change. These results point to the need for scholars to examine the potential impacts of post-policy change dynamics on policy development.
Natural Hazards and Weather 4
How people use weather information and respond to hurricane warnings, and who the public holds responsible for disaster preparedness.
- . 2021. “Social Capital and Hurricane Warning Response.” International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 65.Publisher’s Version
Abstract
Social capital — resources that are available as a result of social relationships and connections — has been shown to be an important component across the various stages of a natural disaster, such as a hurricane. Additionally, research has shown that the importance of the different types of social capital — bonding, bridging, and linking — can vary as the disaster progresses from preparation, to the immediate aftermath, to long-term recovery. Yet, findings are not consistent regarding the impact of social capital on taking protective action (e.g., evacuation, shelter in home or community) following a hurricane warning. In this paper, we leverage an original survey of 1450 residents living in coastal communities in the Southeast and Gulf Coast regions of the United States to examine the role of social capital in stated behaviors in response to a hurricane warning. Additionally, we examine the stated likelihood of evacuating if advised to by close contacts (friends, family, and co-workers) and elite sources (emergency management officials, elected officials, and the media). We find that bonding social capital is associated with an increased likelihood to evacuate and shelter in home as well as an increased likelihood to listen to close contacts that encourage evacuation. In addition, we find that linking social capital is associated with an increased likelihood of evacuation if encouraged to by elite sources. - . 2023. “Determining Patterns of Routine Weather Information Usage and Their Demographic Determinants.” Weather, Climate, and Society, 15(3): 711–725.Publisher’s Version
Abstract
Social science studies of weather and natural hazards have examined in depth the sources of information individuals use in response to a disaster. This research has primarily focused on information sources in isolation and as they relate to severe weather. Thus, less research has examined how individuals use information acquisition strategies during routine times. This paper addresses this limitation by examining patterns of routine weather information source usage. Using three unique survey datasets and Latent Class Analysis, we find that weather information source usage can be summarized by a limited number of coherent classes. Importantly, our results suggest weather information types, or classes, are generally consistent across datasets and samples. We also find demographic determinants, particularly age, help explain class membership; older respondents were more likely to belong to classes less reliant on technology-based information sources. Income and education also were related to more complex or comprehensive information use strategies. Results suggest the prevalent view of single-source information usage in previous research may not be adequate for understanding how individuals access information, in both routine and extreme contexts. - . 2021. “Public Attribution of Responsibility for Disaster Preparedness across Three Levels of Government and the Public: Lessons from a Survey of Residents of the U.S. South Atlantic and Gulf Coast Areas.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 51(2): 212–237.Publisher’s Version
Abstract
Using survey data collected from residents of counties along the South Atlantic and Gulf Coasts of the United States, we use innovative compositional - . 2012. “Weather, Climate and Worldviews: The Sources and Consequences of Public Perceptions of Changes in Local Weather Patterns.” Weather, Climate, and Society, 4(2): 132–144.Publisher’s Version
Abstract
In this paper we analyze the changes Americans perceive to be taking place in their local weather, and test a series of hypotheses about why they hold these perceptions. Using data from annual nationwide surveys of representative samples of the American public taken from 2008 to 2011, coupled with geographically specific measures of temperature and precipitation changes over that same period, we evaluate the relationship between perceptions of weather changes and actual changes in local weather. In addition, the survey data includes measures of, individual level characteristics (age, education level, gender, income) as well as cultural worldview and political ideology. We test rival hypotheses about the origins of Americans’ perceptions of weather change, and find that actual weather changes are less predictive of perceived changes in local temperatures, but better predictors of perceived flooding and droughts. Cultural biases and political ideology also shape perceptions of changes in local weather. Overall, our analysis indicates that beliefs about changes in local temperatures have been more heavily politicized than is true for beliefs about local precipitation patterns. Therefore risk communications linking changes in local patterns of precipitation to broader changes in the climate are more likely penetrate identity-protective cognitions about climate.
Deliberation, Trust, and Expertise 5
Citizen deliberation and mini-publics, technocracy, and public support for citizen, expert, and elected-official decision-making.
- . 2026. “Deciding Who Decides: Trust and Support for Elected Official, Expert, and Citizen Decision-Making Regarding Nuclear Waste Management.” Review of Policy Research, 43(1).Publisher’s Version
Abstract
Many policy issues, such as nuclear waste management, are complex and require expertise to address. In many such policy areas, decisions are made by elected officials with input largely from experts and not the public or other stakeholders. However, such top-down approaches can create mistrust and political opposition. In the case of nuclear waste management in the United States, the selection of a single waste repository (Yucca Mountain in Nevada) by Congress led to strong opposition, stagnation, and an eventual call for a participatory, consent-based siting approach to determine the location for a nuclear waste repository. While consent-based siting is appealing, it is not clear if the public, broadly speaking, would support a participatory approach or an expert-driven approach regarding nuclear waste management. In this paper, we examine public trust and public preferences for policy influence among elected officials, experts, and citizens. Specifically, we develop and test a theoretical framework that posits that the various cultural worldviews—hierarchy, egalitarianism, individualism, and fatalism—shape trust in policy actors and that cultural worldviews and trust shape which policy actors the public believes should influence nuclear waste policymaking. Overall, we find the public trusts citizens and experts more than the government and elected officials. Additionally, we find that the public thinks experts should have more influence on nuclear waste policy than citizens or elected officials. Finally, regarding cultural worldviews, hierarchs tended to trust experts and elected officials and support their influence, whereas egalitarians tended to trust citizens and support their influence. - . 2023. “Technical Issues and Engagement Processes: Support for Citizen and Expert Deliberation Regarding the Management of Nuclear Waste.” Frontiers in Communication, 8.Publisher’s Version
Abstract
Deliberative forums have been increasingly used to involve citizens in policymaking, but it is unclear whether people trust their fellow citizens to make decisions in highly technical areas like nuclear policy relative to more commonly used expert bodies. We examine public support for citizen and expert deliberation regarding the siting of nuclear waste facilities and note the role of values, views on deliberation, and civic experiences on support for each type of deliberation. We find that past civic experiences are associated with increased support for citizen decision-making. In addition, we find that underlying views on nuclear power may be more important in shaping support for a decision on nuclear waste facility siting than attitudes toward particular kinds of governance processes. - . 2022. “The Internal Dynamics of ‘Scaling Up’ Deliberative Mini-Publics.” Communication and the Public, 7(3): 146–164.Publisher’s Version
Abstract
Recent deliberative systems research has emphasized the need to “scale up” deliberative mini-publics by exploring connections between mini-publics and broader a… - . 2021. “Political Beliefs, Views about Technocracy, and Energy and Climate Policy Preferences.” Public Understanding of Science, 30(3): 331–348.Publisher’s VersionCode (GitHub)
Abstract
The use of technocratic decision-making, where policy decisions are made by elite experts, is an important aspect of policymaking in the United States. However, little work has examined public opinion about technocracy. Using data from a representative sample of the United States (n = 1200), I explore differences in support for technocracy and the implications of that support for views about politically controversial energy sources and climate policies. Overall, I find that liberal Democrats, moderate/conservative Democrats, and moderate/liberal Republicans were more likely than conservative Republicans and moderate independents to support technocratic decision-making. In addition, I find that as support for technocracy increases, so does support for energy sources and climate policies; however, there are significant interaction effects across political beliefs.
Environmental Governance and Collaboration 8
Polycentric governance, collaboration among public managers and stakeholders, and coastal adaptation to sea-level rise.
- . 2022. “Who Should ‘Do More’ about Climate Change? Cultural Theory, Polycentricity, and Public Support for Climate Change Actions across Actors and Governments.” Review of Policy Research, 39(4): 468–485.Publisher’s Version
Abstract
Under a polycentric approach to climate change, action is taken at different scales and across all levels of government and sectors of society. Some scholars have argued that such an approach is the best lens to view the governance of climate change and that a polycentric approach has advantages in addressing collective-action problems. However, taking a polycentric approach would require public support for action at multiple scales. The issue of climate change is polarized across political beliefs and cultural worldviews and little research has examined how the public views climate action at one level of government relative to others as well as relative to actions by the private sector and by individuals. Using an original survey of the US public from October 2017, I explore who it is that the public thinks should ‘do more’ about climate change and the role that the cultural worldviews posited by cultural theory—hierarchical, egalitarian, individualist, and fatalist—plays in shaping those opinions. Overall, I find support for multiple actors doing more to address climate change, but with differences in support between egalitarians and individualists for actors overall and for the federal government in particular. - . 2026. “Cultural Theory, Political Ideology, and Burden Tolerance: The Role of Core Beliefs in Shaping Support for Administrative Burdens.” The American Review of Public Administration, Forthcoming.Publisher’s Version
Abstract
Administrative burdens embedded within many public policies are often politically contentious, such that core values and belief systems can drive either support or opposition. In this paper, we use survey data from US respondents to replicate and extend previous research on the public acceptance of administrative burdens in general. First, we confirm the measure’s validity by examining its effects on beliefs across policies that range from highly polarized to less politically contentious. Second, we test the relationship between tolerance of administrative burden and cultural theory (CT) variables that tap into worldview orientations related to hierarchy, egalitarianism, individualism, and fatalism, which previous research has found predictive of policy preferences across a wide range of domains, even after accounting for political ideology and partisanship. We hypothesize that egalitarians and individualists will generally be less tolerant of burdens, while hierarchs will be more accepting of burdensome requirements. However, this effect varies depending on the nature of the burdens and how they relate to perceived threats for each worldview. - . 2026. “Sea-Level Rise Adaptation and Collaboration in Polycentric Governance: A Comparison of Three Regions.” Public Administration Review, Forthcoming.Publisher’s Version
Abstract
Adaptation to sea-level rise confronts coastal communities worldwide with a new set of collective action problems that require collaboration. When does collaboration result in concrete action for adaptation? To address this question, we combine the Ecology of Games and Collaborative Governance frameworks using a comparative analysis of three coastal regions in the United States. We leverage original survey data from the San Francisco Bay Area in California (2018, N = 878), the Tri-County (Charleston) Area in South Carolina (2022, N = 152), and the Hampton Roads region in Virginia (2023, N = 153), three regions that differ in terms of vulnerability, institutional capacity, and political culture. Across all three regions, we find that collaboration in sea-level rise adaptation is driven by a core set of high-capacity actors who build and participate across multiple planning forums in polycentric governance arrangements. - . 2024. “Identifying Barriers Preventing Stormwater Pond Buffer Implementation in Coastal South Carolina.” Journal of South Carolina Water Resources, 9(2).
- . 2021. “Public Attribution of Responsibility for Disaster Preparedness across Three Levels of Government and the Public: Lessons from a Survey of Residents of the U.S. South Atlantic and Gulf Coast Areas.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 51(2): 212–237.Publisher’s Version
Abstract
Using survey data collected from residents of counties along the South Atlantic and Gulf Coasts of the United States, we use innovative compositional
View all 8 in Environmental Governance and Collaboration → #
Research Methods and Teaching 3
Quantitative text analysis, open educational resources for quantitative methods, and teaching methods to students of public policy.
- . 2024. “Teaching Quantitative Methods to Students of Public Policy.” In Handbook of Teaching Public Policy, eds. Philippe Zittoun and Emily St Denny. Edward Elgar Publishing, 168–180.
Abstract
The use of quantitative methods is ubiquitous across the field of public policy. Such methods are used in policy analysis and evaluation as well as by scholars of the policy process. The broad use of quantitative methods requires that these methods are taught to a wide array of students in various programs including undergraduate programs, Master in Public Administration (MPA), Master in Public Policy (MPP), and Ph.D. programs in public affairs, political science, and economics, among others. In this chapter, we delineate a few key considerations when teaching quantitative methods to policy students. First is know your audience. As noted, students of public policy are spread across programs and have varying career goals. Therefore, there is not a one-size-fits-all approach to teaching quantitative methods, rather some students (e.g., MPA) will be best served learning to be sophisticated consumers of quantitative methods, whereas other students (e.g., Ph.D.) will need to be sophisticated users. Second is emphasize theory. Theory - the logical propositions that connect cause and effect - is a vital component of building scientific knowledge and is also vital to policy design and analysis. Therefore, students should understand the importance of theory and how theoretical claims are challenged and empirically tested. Third is learn by doing. Quantitative methods are best understood through application. Students at all levels should be required to find or collect data, determine the appropriate method to analyze that data, and be able to communicate the results. Finally, build good habits. Good habits in quantitative methods include proper data management, openness about assumptions and data limitations, and producing work that can easily be replicated. Additionally, the use of open-source tools is an important component of good habits. - . 2017. “Quantitative Research Methods for Political Science, Public Policy, and Public Administration.” University Libraries, University of Oklahoma. SHAREOK, Open Education Resource.Open TextbookDOI
Abstract
The focus of this book is on using quantitative research methods to test hypotheses and build theory in political science, public policy and public administration. It is designed for advanced undergraduate courses, or introductory and intermediate graduate-level courses. The first part of the book introduces the scientific method, then covers research design, measurement, descriptive statistics, probability, inference, and basic measures of association. The second part of the book covers bivariate and multiple linear regression using the ordinary least squares, the calculus and matrix algebra that are necessary for understanding bivariate and multiple linear regression, the assumptions that underlie these methods, and then provides a short introduction to generalized linear models. The book fully embraces the open access and open source philosophies. The book is freely available in the SHAREOK repository; it is written in R Markdown files that are available in a public GitHub repository; it uses and teaches R and RStudio for data analysis, visualization and data management; and it uses publicly available survey data (from the Meso-Scale Integrated Socio-geographic Network) to illustrate important concepts and methods. We encourage students to download the data, replicate the examples, and explore further! We also encourage instructors to download the R Markdown files and modify the text for use in different courses. - . 2016. “Modeling Issue Definitions using Quantitative Text Analysis.” Policy Studies Journal, 44(3): 309–331.